What the Army Corps of Engineers DID NOT Learn from the 1993 Floods
In 1993, record smashing floods ravaged the state of Iowa much like they are this week. Although the floods happening right now are far worse than 1993, no one had ever seen or heard of a flood event of the magnitude that happened in '93. The floods of '93 caused wide spread damage to homes and businesses and were burned into the minds of every person that experienced them that year. After the floods, an joint enquiry was held between Iowa City, The City of Coralville, and the Army Corps of Engineers to determine if there was any way to more optimally regulate the outflow from the Coralville Reservoir and Dam that holds back the Iowa River north of Iowa City and Coralville.
In 1997, after several years of beurocratic meetings, the Corps of Engineers determined, suprisingly, that "There is no Federal interest in a study of the optimal regulation of the reservoir." The Corps was unwilling to hear any public input regarding this decision and ceased any efforts on developing a written contingency plan for lake operation in the event of a flash flood.
In spite of the firm decision handed down to the public by the Corps of Engineers, Larry Molnar and Charles Newsome wrote a review of some of the major procedural and technical flaws of the Corp's decision. In their report, Larry and Charles suggest that the Corps was ignoring an opportunity to take some factors into account when optimizing the regulation of the reservoir. Among other things, Larry and Charles mention a potential long-term climate shift that was not a consideration in the original design of the reservoir and dam. This reference to Global Warming, would most likely be well received today, but in 1997, it was dismissed without further discussion. This report was forwarded on to the Corps of Engineers in 1997 and I can find no record of any response to it from the Corps.
Leading up to this event, I watched the Corps of Engineers restrict the outflow of the Coralville Dam to well below capacity for weeks, while at the same time hearing others warn of an impending flood event. I am not an expert in hydrological events, and I am struggling to understand the theory behind the reservoir management protocols. I suspect that there is more to the story than meets the eye. I'm confident that the Corps of Engineers has followed protocols in this event and is not to blame for the flood occurring today. I wonder if it would have been possible for anyone to construct a new reservoir management protocol that could have protected us from this event.
The severe flooding of Iowa is being heard around the world. My friend from Ireland sent me the link she found. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7454928.stm
It would be interesting to see who knew what and when they knew it. I reviewed papers from last week and the outflow was 6 to 8,000 cu ft sec. could they have been more proactive in minimizing the tremendous damage that has occurred?
I suppose it's hard to predict what will happen in the future and maybe their protocol is focused on minimizing flooding downstream. Still, I remember having a few discussions with people while the flow rate was around that level and wondering why they didn't just open it wide. I also read in some of their operational procedures that there is only a certain amount of flow rate that they can increase each day - kind of a self imposed dampening. Too bad the weather did not follow that same protocol.
Does weather ever follow a protocol?
This is just more evidence, albeit in much more technical analysis, of what I instinctively knew from going through this process. The US Army Corps of Engineers is quite possibly the most incompetent organization on the planet. That reservoir might as well be run by a bunch of 4th graders from Arkansas. They truly could not have done a worse job. The whole lot of those clowns should be in charge of Reservoirs in Baghdad, where it doesn't rain.